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In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem 
humans and wildlife species compete for land and prey biomass. We introduce a competitive 
allocation mechanism in both submodels such that economic prices and ecosystem prices 
guide the allocation in the economy and in the ecosystem, respectively. We distinguish the 
scenarios of an open accessible habitat and a privately owned habitat. In both scenarios 
efficiency requires different corrective taxes/subsidies to internalize consumption services 
externalities. In the case of an open access habitat additional sources of inefficiency are the 
divergence of prices for biomass and land in both subsystems. Finally, we determine values of 
all components of the ecosystem in an efficient steady state with special emphasis on the role 
and the interplay of ecosystem and economic prices. 
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 1 The problem
Despite our rich knowledge of signiﬁcant and large-scale interdependencies between the
ecosystem and the economy (Alcamo et al., 2003), many pertaining environmental-economic
studies tend to be somewhat unbalanced by oﬀering an elaborate analysis of economic activ-
ities and far less elaborate modeling of the ecosystem and ecological feedback eﬀects. To the
extent that such studies "... do merge economic and ecosystem concepts [they] tend to ad-
dress isolated markets and a very few species" (Tschirhart, 2000, p. 13). Such approaches
oﬀer limited insights only in the complex impacts on the ecosystem of human activities
such as land conversion for economic use or biomass harvesting. These economic activities
have ramiﬁcations and trigger adaptations in the ecosystem and eventually adversely aﬀect
ecosystem services that support human lives.
In his state-of-the-art survey Brown (2000) emphasizes that renewable natural re-
sources are embedded in complex technological interdependencies of ecosystems and that
their allocation is characterized by an "... interplay of poorly deﬁned property rights, ex-
ternalities and market failure" (p. 875). He also observes that economic models rarely
extend resource interdependence beyond one or two natural resources (similar: Deacon et
al. 1998) and he criticizes the propensity of economists to treat their oversimpliﬁed re-
source models as more than a metaphor when they oﬀer policy advice, e.g. based on an
optimal single species solution that ignores predator-prey interactions and other ecosystem
interdependencies. Among Brown’s (2000) prime research desiderata are increased eﬀorts
to better understand the role and function of ecosystems as well as the need to better inte-
grate economics and ecology. Similar programmatic statements have been made by Finnoﬀ
and Tschirhart (2003a, p. 590).
While economists have a good understanding of the resource allocation mechanism
in market economies by applying the economic concept of general competitive equilibrium
analysis1 we are not aware of a comparable approach to the ecosystem that would be, at the
same time, a suitable microfounded building block for a truly general dynamic equilibrium
analysis encompassing the economy and the ecosystem as its interdependent subsystems.2
To cope with major interdependencies and feedback eﬀects within and between the ecosys-
tem and the economy, we suggest such an integrated general equilibrium analysis that
encompasses both subsystems, the ecosystem and the economy, and treats both at the
same level of analytical complexity. We address the dynamic allocation of land and non-
human biomass with a major focus on the ecosystem model and its links to the economic
1For general equilibrium analyses applied in environmental economics we refer to Mäler (1974), Boven-
berg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996) or Fullerton and Wolverton (2005).
2For dynamic ecological economic analyses along other lines see e.g. van den Bergh and Nijkamp (1991).
1submodel. Economic methodology is used to explain the interaction of species building on
a small but growing literature.
Hannon (1976) formalized the notion and some implications of individual organisms
optimizing net energy. Tschirhart (2000) treats such organisms as ﬁrms and is the ﬁrst, to
our knowledge, who models the ecosystem with optimizing individuals in a general equilib-
rium framework. Organisms incur energy costs, when preying biomass or sacriﬁcing own
biomass, and these transactions costs change endogenously as to equilibrate all predators’
prey biomass and all preys’ loss of own biomass. Finnoﬀ and Tschirhart (2003a, 2003b)
demonstate the capacity of that approach to tackle harvesting with complex intra-ecosystem
interactions in numerical applied analysis. Eichner and Pethig (2005) take up Tschirhart’s
concept of general equilibrium in an integrated ecological-economic system (IEES). They
replace the concept of equilibrating transaction costs by a complete system of competitive
ecosystem markets and show that individual organisms can be interpreted as price-taking
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms under the roof and control of a big artiﬁcial ’agricultural ﬁrm’ (bio-
mass ﬁrm). The present paper deviates from Eichner and Pethig (2005) by recognizing in
the formal model that the ecosystem is guided by an autonomous allocation mechanism of
its own in which organisms are isomorphous to consumers rather than ﬁrms. Christiaans et
al. (2006) model the ecosystem in isolation and determine the resource allocation in that
system with the help of the competitive mechanism treating individual organisms analogous
to price-taking consumers who maximize net oﬀspring under some transactions constraints.
They show that the competitive allocation mechanism, a proven powerful method of deal-
ing with interdependencies in market economies, can be fruitfully applied to model the
intertemporal allocation in the ecosystem.
In the present paper we take up the approach of Christiaans et al. (2006) to the
resource allocation in the ecosystem and link the ecosystem and the economy as interde-
pendent subsystems in an IEES where both subsystems are microfounded and treated at
the same level of structural detail: individual agents optimize subject to constraints and
competitive markets provide for the compatibility of individual actions (plans).3 In this
setup we then focus on public consumptive ecosystem services provided by the ecosystem,
biomass harvested by humans, and land converted for economic use. In our setup hu-
mans compete with all species for land and for (nonhuman) biomass, but that competition
is grossly unbalanced, since humans are top predators restrained only by their perceived
self-interest.
3Large parts of the ecological and bioeconomic literature focus on macro-level approaches regarding
populations as the appropriate units for studying dynamic ecosystem allocations. There are also ecological
models that link individual behavior to population processes (e.g. Persson and de Roos, 2003) but we are
not aware of an attempt to link such models to an equilibrium model of the economy.
2The important feature of the IEES is that in both subsystems all (private) goods
and services are traded on perfectly competitive markets. Disturbances - or shocks - in
one of the subsystems cause allocative displacement eﬀects and change relative scarcities
(prices). The shocks spill over to the other subsystem causing price and quantity feedback
eﬀects although the market systems in both submodels are completely disconnected. It is a
particularly important aspect of our approach, and an innovative one to our knowledge, that
there is a market for land and for prey biomass in each subsystem. Since arbitrage activities
between these markets are ruled out it is not clear whether and how the equilibrium prices
in both market segments will diﬀer. The answer will turn out to depend on the property
rights regime of the habitat. We distinguish the scenarios of an openly accessible habitat
and a privately owned habitat. In the former case biomass in situ and the habitat do not
command positive economic prices while under private ownership the partition of total land
into habitat and land for economic use is governed by comparing proﬁtability.
In both scenarios eﬃciency requires (diﬀerent) corrective taxes/subsidies to internal-
ize the externality constituted by the consumptive ecosystem services with public good
characteristics. In the case of an open access habitat additional sources of ineﬃciency are
the divergence of prices for biomass and land in both subsystems. These extra ineﬃciencies
can be eliminated through taxes on harvested biomass and economic land use equal to, or
even exceeding the ecosystem price of the respective good.
The present approach is strong in providing rich theoretical information on (shadow)
prices in the microfounded ecosystem submodel which is here tied to the general-equilibrium
model of the economy and its economic prices in a rigorous and consistent way. Exploiting
these features we place price tags on and determine values of all components of the ecosys-
tem along an eﬃcient path of the IEES with special emphasis on the role and the interplay
of ecosystem prices and economic prices.
Section 2 outlines the model and section 3 characterizes the eﬃcient allocation of
that model. Section 4 introduces the concept of competitive equilibria of the IEES with
open access habitat and of the IEES with privately owned habitat and presents the main
results on the (in)eﬃciency of such general equilibria. Section 5 determines the value of the
ecosystem and its components and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a non-biomass natural resource whose stock ¯ r ∈ R++ is time-invariant and the use
of which is essential for both humans and nonhuman species. We will refer to that resource
3as land because land appears to be a well ﬁtting and very important example.4 To simplify,
the use of land is assumed to be exclusive in the sense that nonhuman species (species, for
short) cannot live on land used for economic purposes, and land used by species is oﬀ limits
for humans. The land used by humans, r ∈ [0, ¯ r] is called economic land and the land used
by species, ¯ r−r =: s is called habitat. The supply of economic land is expanded or reduced
over time according to5








r := (yr1,...,yr¯ g) ∈ R
¯ g
+ denotes the vector of ¯ g (private) inputs used for mainte-
nance and development of economic land. (1) is interpreted as the technology of a land
converting ﬁrm. By deﬁnition of s the habitat changes over time according to
˙ s = −˙ r = −R(r,yr). (2)
The habitat s is home of¯ i species whose populations are denoted by n⊤ := (n1,...,n¯ i) ∈
R
¯ i
+. Individual organisms belonging to the same species are identical. The representative









i = 1,...,¯ i (3)
at each point in time. In (3) si ∈ R+ denotes organism i’s exclusive use of habitat resources.
For example, plants occupy a patch of land that gives them (limited) access to sunlight,
fresh water and nutrients. The supply of such habitat services is supposed to equal the size
of the patch occupied by the organism.6
The vector z⊤
i := (zi1,...,zii,...zi¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i contains all biomass transactions of organ-
ism i. For i  = j, zij is organism i’s intake of (or in economic terms: organism i’s demand
for) biomass of its prey species j, and zii is organism i’s loss (or supply) of own biomass to
its predators. The sign convention is zij ≥ 0 for i  = j and zii ≤ 0.
By deﬁnition of bi and ni the population growth turns out to be
˙ ni = nibi i = 1,...,¯ i. (4)
4At the expense of some stylization, other examples are water basins, water courses or air sheds.
5Upper case letters denote functions and subscripts attached to them indicate ﬁrst derivatives. A plus
or minus sign underneath an argument denotes the sign of the respective partial derivative.
6This setup describes land used by plants quite well but mobile animals use land in diﬀerent ways.
Although their land use could be modeled by introducing land services as (congestible) public goods, we
refrain from that extension to keep the exposition simple.
4Being the top predators in the IEES, humans compete with nonhuman species for prey
biomass. Let hi ≥ 0 be the biomass of species i harvested by humans. hi is the output of









i = 1,...,¯ i, (5)
where y⊤
i := (yi1,...,yi¯ g) ∈ R
¯ g
+ are harvesting inputs and where Hi
ni > 0 is the population
stock externality known from classical harvesting models. Economic goods and services are




















input of harvested biomass and where y⊤
f := (yf1,...,yf¯ g) ∈ R¯ g is the input-output vector
of goods and services. The sign convention is that g is an output, if yfg > 0, and an input,
if yfg < 0.
The human population of consumers is time-invariant. With all consumers being










c := (qc1,...,qc¯ k) ∈ R
¯ k is a vector of public ecosystem services7 and y⊤
c :=
(yc1,...,yc¯ g) ∈ R¯ g is a vector of goods and services such that ycg is a (private) good or
service for consumption, if ycg > 0, and it is a labor service supplied by the consumer, if















7The ecosystem services considered here ”... are not traded or valued in the marketplace ... [and] ...
serve as public good rather than provide direct beneﬁts to individual land owners” (Daily et al. 1997, p.
13). The consumption of these ecosystem services can alternatively be interpreted as the nonconsumptive
use of renewable resources whose economic value may be substantial (Brown, 2000, p. 887).
8Qr < 0 in (8) because according to Daily et al. (1997) relatively undisturbed land sustains the
delivery of essential ecosystem services. Albers (1996) argues that preserved land can provide to neighboring
economic land various beneﬁts such as local climate eﬀects, recreation, emission control or an enhanced
view.
5The IEES is closed with the help of the following resource constraints:
yf ≥ yc +
 
i
yi + yr, (9)
q ≥ qc, (10)
h ≥ hf, (11)







njzji + hi = 0 i = 1,...,¯ i, (14)
where h := (h1,...,h¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i
+. The resource constraint (9) is similar to that in conventional
Debreu-type general equilibrium models of the economy where it is, in fact, the only re-
source constraint. All other constraints (10) - (14) specify and formalize the fundamental
interdependence between the ecosystem and the economy: The inequality (10) forces the
economy to be content with whatever ecosystem services q are provided by the ecosystem.
The inequalities (11) and (12) constrain the economic demand for the ecosystem goods bio-
mass and land to the amount of biomass harvested and to the land converted, respectively.
The inequality (13) and the equation (14) force the nonhuman species to accommodate to
the economic land use and biomass predation, respectively. (13) - (14) reﬂect the iron rule
of the IEES, that all nonhuman species have to contend themselves with what is left after
humans have set apart land and biomass for their own use.
We refrain from modeling durable human-made capital goods, capital formation and
pollution since these additional features would severely raise the complexity of the analysis
without providing new insights.
3 Allocative eﬃciency in the IEES
To explore the eﬃciency properties of a general equilibrium of the IEES, consider as a






−δtU (qc,yc)dt s.t. (1) - (14).
6We write down the Hamiltonian associated to that complex control problem for the purpose
of keeping track of the Lagrange multipliers and co-state variables:9
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The relevant implications of the ﬁrst-order conditions of solving (15) are listed in the ﬁrst
column of Table 1.10,11 The existence issue is answered in12
Proposition 1.
If the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk (all k), R
are concave, a solution (α,β,γ,ρ,A
m,A
y) to the Hamiltonian (15) exists.
4 The decentralized IEES: Competitive markets in both
subsystems
As is well known, the performance of the competitive mechanism crucially depends on the
speciﬁcation of property rights since the emergence of competitive markets presupposes
the exclusive assignment (and eﬀective costless enforcement) of property rights. Economic
goods as well as many natural resources that humans and species compete for are exclusively
owned by economic agents. Yet there are also important open access resources, the commons
that are the habitat of communities of species.13 We therefore proceed by distinguishing
9In view of (1) and (2) ρ is the costate variable associated to r and γ is the costate variable associated
to the state variable s.
10To simplify the exposition we assume in Table 1 that in the solution the variables yr1,yi1,yf1,yc1 and
zi1 (for i = 1,...,¯ i) take on nonzero values for all t. The correct reading of the qualiﬁers ”all i” etc. in
Table 1 is that the equation preceding such a qualiﬁer holds for all variables xi whose solution values are
nonzero.
11The economic interpretation of the eﬃciency rules listed in Table 1 is left to the reader. For some
discussion in a similar context see Eichner and Pethig (2006).
12The proof of all propositions is delegated to the Appendix.
13Moreover, in many developing countries natural resources are de facto free access resources because
existing property rights are poorly or not at all enforced.
7First-order conditions for a
No. social optimum general equilibrium with general equilibrium with







































































































































9a ˙ ρ − ˙ γ = (ρ − γ)(δ − Rr) − αr −
 
k UqckQk
r + αs, ˙ ρr = ρr (δ − Rr) − pr + θr, ˙ ρr − ˙ γr = (ρr − γr)(δ − Rr) − pr + θr + ps + θs,




Ryrg ρr − γr =
pyg
Ryrg
































Table 1: Characterization of optimum and equilibrium allocations in the IEES
8two alternative scenarios of economic agents’ property rights with respect to land and its
uses: private ownership and open access.
Explaining the allocation in the ecosystem by means of the competitive mechanism14
also requires to implicitly deﬁning property rights in the ecosystem: each organism will be
assumed to ’own’ its own biomass and a share of the habitat resource endowment (sunlight,
water, nutrients).15 All organisms will then be treated analogous to economic consumers
paying for purchased habitat services and prey biomass by their endowment income and
their income earned by selling own biomass. Although this approach clearly is an export
of conventional economic methodology, Christiaans et al. (2006) link it to the ecological
literature and elaborate in some detail its plausible and - in our view - convincing ecological
interpretations.
In the following subsection 4.1 the competitive mechanism for the ecosystem is for-
mally deﬁned and explained for predetermined human biomass harvesting and economic
land use. After that the conventional competitive mechanism is introduced for the econ-
omy. Subsection 4.2 considers the case of an economy facing an open access habitat implying
that biomass harvesting and land conversion is ’free of charge’ (though subject to produc-
tion costs). In subsection 4.3 the economy faces an ecosystem with the habitat and the
economic land being privately owned such that all land uses and biomass harvesting are
marketed activities.
4.1 The competitive mechanism in the ecosystem
In this subsection we specify the allocation mechanism in the ecosystem. Following Christi-
aans et al. (2006) we assume that at each point in time the allocation of land and biomasses
is determined in the ecosystem by a mechanism that works as if these goods were traded
on competitive markets by all organisms which are supposed to behave as if they maxi-
mize their net oﬀspring subject to some transactions constraint. More speciﬁcally, denote
by πs ∈ R+ the ecosystem price of land and by π⊤
z := (πz1,...,πz¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i
+ the ecosystem
prices for all species’ biomass.16 For notational relief, we write π := (πz,πs) and we de-
14Tschirhart (2000, 2003) forcefully pleads for applying general equilibrium analysis to the ecosystem
but he emphasizes, at the same time, that there are important diﬀerences between a general equilibrium
ecosystem allocation mechanism and the (economic) competitive mechanism.
15An alternative modeling approach suggested by Pethig and Tschirhart (2001) is to assume free access
to the habitat resources for all organisms.
16These prices are meant to be scarcity indicators as perceived by the organisms. To avoid clumsy
wording we call them prices, nonetheless, and refer to ’ecosystem markets’ although there exist neither a
currency nor institutionalized markets in the ecosystem. Interestingly, these features are also missing in
9note by K the function describing an entire time path of the (possibly multidimensional)
variable k. In other words, the functional sign K is supposed to convey the information
kt = K(t) for all t ∈ [0,∞[. For example, Π = (Π
z,Π
s) describes speciﬁc time paths of
prices πt := (πzt,πst) such that πt = Π(t), πzt = Π
z(t) and πst = Π
s(t).17 With this




i (si,zi) s.t. πs (ωi − si) ≥ π
⊤
z   (zi + hi), (16)
where h
⊤
i := (hi1,...,hij,...,hi¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i
+ with hij ≡ 0 for i  = j and hii ≡ hi/ni and where









is a set of constant weights. By deﬁnition of ωi ( ) it is true that
 
j njωj ( ) = s which
gives rise to the interesting interpretation that the habitat is owned by all organisms.18
To interpret (16) and (17) consider the simple case of an organism i that is preyed
upon and that preys itself on some species j  = i and the habitat resource, s. Consequently







≥ πssi + πzjzij. (16’)
The left side of (16’) gives us the organism’s total disposable income, the exogenous ’en-
dowment income, πsωi, and the value of its sacriﬁce of own biomass to ecosystem predators,
−πzizii ≥ 0. This sacriﬁce is the analogue of the consumer’s labor income, and the amount
of own biomass harvested by humans, hi/ni, corresponds to a tax on labor income. The
organism spends its total income on nutrients, si, and on prey biomass, zij, at prevailing
prices. To get a better understanding of the ecological rationale of (16’) suppose ﬁrst that
zii = hi = 0. The organism i is able to buy a bundle (si,zij) worth up to πsωi without
being forced to sacriﬁce own biomass.19 Note that the consumption bundles (si,zij) that
the standard general equilibrium model of the neoclassical economy.
17Putting up with a slight misuse of notation in favor of simplicity we will denote by R, H and Q the
functions determining time paths of converted land, harvested biomass and ecosystem services, respectively,
although these functions diﬀer from the functions R, Hi and Q in (1), (5) and (8).
18See also Christiaans et al. (2006). Note, however, that organism i’s income from its entitlement to
habitat services, πsωi (s,n), is subject to endogenous price changes while in Christiaans et al. (2006) that
income is assumed to be ’exogenous’ (implying that the pertinent functions of biomass supply and demand
are not homogeneous of degree zero in prices).
19Since top predators do not sacriﬁce own biomass they live entirely on their - supposedly large - endow-
ment income. More generally, the higher species i’s trophic level the greater tends to be its endowment ωi
which is therefore connotative to the notion of the species ’predation power’.
10can be purchased from the endowment income depend on the values of πs, n1,...,n¯ i, hi
and πzj that prevail in the short-run period under consideration.
On the other hand, if we assume ωi = hi = 0 for expository purposes it is obvious
that in case of positive prices πs and πzj organism i cannot take up any nutrient or prey
biomass unless it is prepared to sacriﬁce some of its own biomass. The underlying reason
is that during preying or foraging organism i exposes itself to its predators and the more
nutrients or prey biomass organism i demands the greater is the risk of being devoured and
the more own biomass has to be sacriﬁced. The risk of being preyed upon while preying
is known as the predation risk in the ecological literature (see Lima and Dik 1990) and
motivates (16’).
Our preceding comments on (16’) imply that when we now allow all variables in
(16’) to be nonzero, organism i will certainly (ﬁrst) take advantage of its option of risk-
free foraging but it may also ﬁnd it optimal to further increase its intake of nutrients and
prey biomass being fully aware that more cannot be obtained without sacriﬁcing some own
biomass.
In this setup, we now deﬁne a competitive general ecological equilibrium as follows:
For any given time paths of human biomass harvesting, H, and economic land use, R,










such that the solutions to all instantaneous optimiza-
tion programs (16) for H and R coincide with A
m and the resource constraints (13) and
(14) hold.
The general ecological equilibrium is a state where all ecosystem markets clear at each
point in time and where no price-taking organism is able to increase its net oﬀspring. To
show in a more explicit way that the general ecological equilibrium consists of a sequence of
short-run (or rather: instantaneous) equilibria recall that at each point in time some vector
v := (h,n,r) is given. Denote by
S
i (π,hii,ni,s) and Z
ij (π,hii,ni,s) (18)
organism i’s demands and supplies determined by solving (16) when prices are π := (πs,πz).









ji (π,hii,ni,s) + hi = 0 (alli)
for the ecosystem prices π∗. These prices π∗ clearly depend on v and we therefore obtain the
short-run equilibrium demands and supplies as functions of v, say Si (v) and Z
i (v), which




, in turn. When the equilibrium
11net oﬀspring is combined with (4) we obtain the system of population growth functions20







We have thus demonstrated that for given H and R the time path of ecological equi-
librium allocations, A








4.2 The competitive mechanism in the IEES with an open access
habitat
First we brieﬂy describe the competitive market economy facing an open access habitat. In
that rather standard economy there are markets for all commodities, for the biomass har-
vested and for economic land. The corresponding market prices are p⊤




h := (ph1,...,ph¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i
+ and pr ∈ R+. In addition, we introduce taxes on harvested
biomass, θ
⊤
h := (θh1,...,θh¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i, on economic land, θr ∈ R, and subsidies on habitat,
θs ∈ R, and on populations θ
⊤
n := (θn1,...,θn¯ i) ∈ R
¯ i. The optimal plans of the economic
agents are speciﬁed as follows:
• For given P, Θ








(pr − θr)r − p
⊤
y   yr
 
dt s.t. (1). (20)
• For given P, Θ










(phi − θhi)hi − p
⊤
y   yi
 
dt s.t. (5). (21)









y   yf − p
⊤
h   hf − prrf
 
dt s.t. (6). (22)






−δtU (qc,yc)dt s.t. p
⊤
y   yc ≤ w and q ≥ qc, (23)
where w are lumpsum payments of proﬁts and government transfers treated as constant
by the consumers.
20Classical bioeconomic harvesting models typically assume rather than derive population growth func-
tions of the type ˙ ni = ˆ Ni (n)−hi for all i. The functions Ni in (19) diﬀer from the functions ˆ Ni in several
important aspects: Ni
hi < 0 but Ni
hi  = −1 (in general) versus ˆ Ni
hi = −1; Ni
hj  = 0 (in general) versus
ˆ Ni
hj = 0; Ni
r > 0 (in general) versus ˆ Ni
r = 0.
12In (20) - (23) all agents are modeled as non-myopic dynamic optimizers although the con-
version ﬁrm is the only agent whose intertemporal plan is non-trivial. As an implication of
the open-access assumption there are no markets for the biomass in situ and land available
for conversion (i.e. the habitat).21 As a consequence the habitat and in situ biomass can be
appropriated for free (rule of capture) by the land converting ﬁrm and the harvesting ﬁrm.
Nonetheless, these ﬁrms will sell their output to the production ﬁrm at a positive price to
cover their marginal costs.22
Note also that all economic agents’ plans (20) - (23) are directly or indirectly linked
to ecological variables: The land converting ﬁrm and the harvesting ﬁrm take land and
biomass, respectively, from nonhuman species; the production ﬁrm transforms economic
land and harvested biomass into consumer goods; and consumers rely on ecosystem services.
Having completed the description of the market economy we now deﬁne the compet-
itive general equilibrium of the economy facing an open access habitat:
For any given time paths of ecosystem services, Q, species populations, N and taxes Θ a
general equilibrium of the economy facing an open access habitat is constituted by prices P













• the solutions to the optimization programs (20) - (23) for Q, N and Θ coincide with
A
y and
• the resource constraints (9) - (12) are satisﬁed.
That general equilibrium is a state where all markets are cleared at each point in time and
where no price-taking agent is able to improve upon their well-being as speciﬁed by their
respective objective functions. From the perspective of the IEES with open access habitat
this equilibrium is partial, however, since it is conditional on predetermined Q, N and Θ.
The economic activities of land use and harvesting implied by that economic equilibrium
may not be consistent with the given time paths Q, N and Θ on which that equilibrium
has been conditioned.
So far we have introduced the concept of general equilibrium for each subsystem. Yet
these subsystem equilibria are conditioned on variables determined in the other subsystem.
The concept of competitive general equilibrium of the (entire) IEES with open access habitat
needs to account for these interdependencies:
21The introduction of exclusive property rights for land would not matter as long as the habitat is
worthless for the owner. But it will be shown in the next subsection that an owner of the habitat will be
able to sell the right to harvest biomass.
22One can easily verify that if there were no costs of harvesting and land conversion and no corrective
regulation, economic agents as they are modeled here would destroy the habitat and all nonhuman species.
13For any predetermined time path of taxes, Θ (including the case Θ(t) = 0 for all t) a




y) is a general equilibrium of the economy facing an open access habitat relative to Q
and N and if (Π,A
m) is a general ecosystem equilibrium relative to H and R.
To better understand the structure of the general equilibrium of the IEES with open
access habitat consider a fancy hybrid Cournot-Nash game of two Walrasian auctioneers one
for each submodel. For given Θ their strategies are (P,A
y) and (Π,A
m), respectively, and
they attain their maximum payoﬀ by choosing market-clearing prices in their respective
submodel. Although we do not intend to formalize this ’super game’ we ﬁnd it useful
because it highlights the existence of diﬀerent and disconnected price mechanisms (reﬂecting
decentralized decision making) in both subsystems.
The next step is to determine the ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the general
equilibrium of the IEES. The Hamiltonians and Lagrangeans associated to the individual
optimization programs (16) and (20) - (23) are:
L
r = (pr − θr)r − p
⊤






(phi − θhi)hi − p
⊤














y   yf − p
⊤






c = U (qc,yc) + λ
⊤
q   (q − qc) + λc(w − p
⊤
y   yc), (23’)
L
i = B
i (si,zi) + λi
 
πs (ωi − si) − π
⊤
z   (hi + zi)
 
. (24’)
The relevant implications of the ﬁrst-order conditions of solving (20’) - (24’) are listed in
the second column of Table 1. With that information we now address the question whether
an eﬃcient allocation of IEES can be sustained as a general equilibrium of the IEES with
open access habitat supported by suitable taxes.
Our ﬁnding is made precise in
Proposition 2.
If the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk (all k), R
are concave, there exists a distribution of proﬁt shares and lumpsum transfers to consumers
such that [(P,A
y), (Π,A
m)] is an eﬃcient general equilibrium of the IEES with open access
habitat, if and only if for all t prices and tax rates are assigned the values
• phi = αvi (all i), pr = αr, pyg = αyg (all g) (economic prices),
• πzi = αzi > 0 (all i), πs = αs (ecosystem prices),





Uycg > 0 (any g), θhi = πzi > 0 (all i) (tax rates) .
With its speciﬁc assignment of prices and tax rates Proposition 2 is a decentralization result
in the ﬂavor of the second theorem of welfare economics. Yet Proposition 2 is not a full-
blown generalization of that theorem from neoclassical economic models to the IEES for the
following reason. The second theorem of welfare economics states, essentially, that every
eﬃcient allocation of the economy can be decentralized by prices provided the consumers’
endowments and proﬁt shares are speciﬁed and consumers receive appropriate redistribu-
tive (positive or negative) lumpsum transfers. This lumpsum redistribution is a necessary
qualiﬁer because the social planner ignores endowments and transfers in both the IEES
(as evident from (15)) and the neoclassical economy. In both models lumpsum transfers
to consumers are feasible. But one would also need to redistribute the organisms’ endow-
ments (17) to be able to decentralize each and every solution of (15). Yet, the redistribution
of these endowments is not at the social planner’s disposal because these endowments are
meant to be intrinsic attributes of the organisms. This is why the second theorem of welfare
economics cannot be fully extended from models of the economy to the IEES.
Proposition 2 implies that laissez-faire equilibria (deﬁned by θr = θhi ≡ 0) are inef-
ﬁcient. There are three reasons for this ineﬃcieny: (i) wrong economic price signals for
land, (ii) wrong economic price signals for biomass and (iii) a non-internalized consumptive
ecosystem services externality.23 Since eﬃciency requires positive tax rates the economic
prices for land and biomass tend to be too low in the laissez-faire regime and therefore
economic land and harvested biomass tend to be overprovided.24 In the case of biomass,
the eﬃcient tax rate is a markup on the economic biomass price equal to the ecosystem
price of that biomass implying that in laissez-faire economic agents fail to account for the
scarcity of biomass in the ecosystem. In the case of land conversion an analogous argument







Although it is a valid conclusion from Proposition 2 that general equilibria of the
IEES are ineﬃcient, in general, if the tax rates Θ are arbitrarily chosen (e.g. with their
laissez-faire values Θ = 0), it remains the question whether such equilibria exist. This
question is answered in
23The model contains another two (potential) stock externalities, namely Rr > 0 in (1) and Hi
ni > 0
in (5). These externalities are internalized, however, in our economy submodel owing to our simplifying
assumption that there is only a single land conversion ﬁrm and a single harvesting ﬁrm.
24It is not easy to make this observation rigorous, however, because it compares two diﬀerent, highly
complex general equilibrium allocations.
15Proposition 3.
Suppose the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk (all
k), R are concave. There is a set Ω of time paths of taxes Θ such that there exists a general
equilibrium of the IEES with open access habitat for predetermined Θ if and only if Θ ∈ Ω.
4.3 The competitive mechanism in the IEES with privately owned
habitat
In this subsection we turn to an economy with private ownership of land. We assume
that the land conversion ﬁrm owns all land, the habitat as well as the economic land. It
oﬀers the economic land to the production ﬁrm at price pr ∈ R+ and it oﬀers the right to
harvest biomass in the habitat at price ps ∈ R+ per unit of land to the harvesting ﬁrm.
The conversion ﬁrm’s strategy to convert habitat into economic land or vice versa depends
on the relative proﬁtability of both kinds of land uses. Having full information about the
ecosystem dynamics that we described in subsection 4.1 the harvesting ﬁrm is assumed to
take into account the impact of her harvesting activities on population growth.
While the optimal plans of the consumer and the producer remain as in (22) and (23),
the optimal plans of the land conversion ﬁrm and the harvesting ﬁrm are now given by:
• For given P, Θ
r, Θ








(pr − θr)r + (ps + θs)s − p
⊤
y   yr
 
dt s.t. (1), (2). (24)
• For given P, Θ













(phihi + θnini) − pss − p
⊤
y   yi
 
dt
s.t. (3), (4), (5), (18). (25)
A closer look at (25) shows that the organisms’ demand and supply functions (18), the
net oﬀspring function (4) and the population dynamics (5) are constraints and that the
ecosystem prices are decision variables in the harvesting ﬁrm’s program of maximizing
of present value proﬁts. The harvesting ﬁrm respects and accounts for the optimizing
behavior of all organisms as well as the ecosystem law of eating and being eaten. Unlike
ranchers who feed their lifestock and shelter it against predators the harvesting ﬁrm in the
present model chooses its optimal intertemporal harvesting strategy by taking all ’natural’
ecosystem interactions into account. It thus diﬀers greatly from the social planner who
16calculates the solution to (15) and then assigns a consumption, production and feeding
program, respectively, to the consumers, producers and organisms without any regard to
’autonomous’ optimizing behavior of individual agents. The harvesting ﬁrm is modelled
here as a Stackelberg leader with the organisms being Stackelberg followers. It accounts for
the organism’s "reaction functions" (here demand and supply functions (18)) inducing the
organisms to choose the ecological allocation implied by (16).25
Having speciﬁed the economic agents optimization programs we are now in the posi-
tion to deﬁne the competitive general equilibrium of the IEES with privately owned habitat:26
For any given time path of ecosystem services Q and taxes Θ (including the case Θ(t) = 0
for all t) a general equilibrium of the private ownership IEES is constituted by prices (P,Π)
and an allocation (A
m,A
y) such that




• the resource constraints (9) - (14) are satisﬁed.
Following the procedure of the last subsection we solve the Hamiltoneans and Lagrangeans
(22’), (23’) and
L
r = (pr − θr)r + (ps + θs)s − p
⊤





phihi − pss − p
⊤































ij (π,hii,n,s) − zij
 
(21”)
and obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions listed in the third column of Table 1.27 The eﬃciency
implications are summarized in
Proposition 4.
If the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk (all k), R
25Obviously, the informational requirements on the part of the harvesting ﬁrm of solving (25) are ex-
tremely demanding which characterizes that procedure as a polar case. An opposite polar case has been
modeled in the previous subsection since under open access the ecosystem dynamics have been no part
of any economic agent’s optimization calculus. In the scenario of private habitat ownership incomplete
information on the complex ecosystem dynamics would appear to be realistic. Yet an analysis of decision
making under uncertainty is beyond the scope of the present paper.
26When the habitat is privately owned the equilibrium of the IEES cannot be decomposed anymore into
equilibria of its subsystems.
27The derivation of rows 2, 3, 7, 8 and 10 in column 3 can be found in the Appendix.
17are concave, there exists a distribution of proﬁt shares and lumpsum transfers to consumers
such that [(P,A
y), (Π,A
m)] is an eﬃcient general equilibrium of IEES with privately owned
habitat, if and only if for all t prices and tax rates are assigned the values
• phi = αvi (all i), pr = αr, ps = αs, pyg = αyg (all g) (economic prices),
• πzi = αzi > 0 (all i), πs = αs (ecosystem prices),










Uycg > 0 (all i, any g)
(tax rates, subsidies) .
As in the IEES with open access habitat the laissez-faire equilibria (θr = θs = θni = 0)
of the IEES with privately owned habitat are ineﬃcient, too. While the price signals
for biomass are now right there remain two sources for ineﬃciency: (i) a non-internalized
ecosystem service externality of habitat, (ii) non-internalized ecosystem service externalities
of populations. In the laissez-faire equilibrium allocation the habitat and the populations
tend to be too small. These ineﬃciencies can be corrected by subsidizing the habitat and
the populations. Obviously, instead of inducing the land conversion ﬁrm to extend the
habitat through a subsidy the government could also tax economic land thus providing an
incentive for the land conversion ﬁrm to convert less land. Comparing Propositions 2 and
4 elucidates that under both scenarios the government could levy a tax on economic land
but under open access the land tax corrects for ecosystem service externalities and for the
ecosystem price of land, πs, whereas the latter emerges in the private ownership economy
in form of the habitat price ps = πs paid by the harvesting ﬁrm. Finally, it is interesting
to observe that in the economy facing a privately owned habitat population subsidies are
applied whereas in the economy facing an open access habitat harvesting taxes are needed to
implement the eﬃcient allocation. Hence under diﬀerent property rights scenarios diﬀerent
corrective policy instruments are called for. Finally, the existence issue is addressed in
Proposition 5.
Suppose the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk
(all k), R are concave. There is a set Υ of time paths of taxes Θ such that there exists
a general equilibrium of the IEES with privately owned habitat for predetermined Θ if and
only if Θ ∈ Υ.
5 The value of the ecosystem and its components
In the remainder of the paper we will determine resource prices and/or values along the
eﬃcient path that has been characterized in Table 1 combined with the Propositions 2
18and 4, respectively. We will use the pertaining marginal eﬃciency conditions for valuing
the components of the ecosystem with a special emphasis on the role and interplay of
ecosystem prices and economic prices. Exploiting that information in a systematic way
will prove the present approach to be a powerful basis for putting price tags on ecosystem
components. The reason is not only because the information our microfounded general-
equilibrium approach to the ecosystem provides on scarcities or (shadow) prices in the
ecosystem is much richer than that in conventional macro-level models of population ecology
but also because the submodel ecosystem is here tied to a general-equilibrium economy
and its economic prices in a rigorous and consistent way. Observe also that the following
valuation exercises do not depend on the property rights regime of the habitat since the
focus is on eﬃcient allocations. Either scenario is covered when the appropriate eﬃciency-
restoring taxes are accounted for that have been speciﬁed in the Propositions 2 and 4,
respectively.
Proposition 6.
(i) In an eﬃcient general equilibrium of the IEES
• the economic price of biomass of species i is
phi = πzi +
pyg
Hi
yig     
[1]
all i, any g, (26)
• the economic price of land services is
























Ryrg       
[4]
any g. (27)
(ii) In a steady state of the eﬃcient general equilibrium of the IEES










































where ε(hi,ni) := niHi
ni/hi > 0;







































To capture the essence of (26) recall that ’harvesting’ of prey biomass by predators in the
ecosystem is costless whereas human predators incur positive marginal harvesting costs [1].
With zero marginal costs of harvesting, i.e. with Hi
yig → ∞, (26) yields phi = πzi. Hence
eﬃciency requires the biomass price of all species i to be the same in both submodels for all
species i that are harvested unless asymmetric conditions in both markets warrant a price
diﬀerence. Although (27) looks much more complex than (26), the same argument applies
for the prices of land services in both subsystems. In [4] the stock externality Rr < 0
increases the marginal conversion costs, pyg/Ryrg, that are positive in the economy but
have no equivalent in the ecosystem. To rule out marginal conversion costs as a cause of
divergence suppose that Ryrg → ∞. This assumption eliminates [4] as well as the dynamic
marginal costs [3]. The remaining factor [2] that renders diﬀerent the eﬃcient land prices in
both submodels represents the external marginal costs generated by the ecosystem services
externality which exists in the economy but has no counterpart in the ecosystem. In fact,
if that externality is ’switched oﬀ’ (for the sake of the argument) by setting Uqck ≡ 0,
then (27) is turned into pr = πs. In other words, eﬃciency requires land services to be
uniformly priced in both subsystems unless these subsystems exhibit diﬀerences in internal
and external marginal costs.
Dynamic marginal land conversion costs [3] accrue in the economy but not in the
ecosystem because humans determine the size of habitat unilaterally and the land conversion
ﬁrm controls for the time path of economic land use. The dynamic marginal costs comprise
two components.
δpyg











> 0, the market value





< 0 the market value of the stock decreases and it may be expensive not to convert
land in good time.
β∗
i from (28) is the price of a living organism i in the long-run equilibrium that is made
up of the present value of the components [5] - [8]. The term [5] represents the external
20beneﬁts of the marginal organism i in form of enhancing the provision of public ecosystem
services; [7] is the marginal beneﬁt of the stock externality Hi
ni > 0; [8] gives us the value
of organism i’s biomass loss due to harvesting. The value β∗
i is reduced by the value of
organism i’s land endowment [6] which represents the opportunity costs of economic land
use.
In (29), ρ∗ is the eﬃcient steady state price of economic land. It equals the present
value of the price of economic land services, p∗
r/(δ − Rr), (where the relevant discount
rate is not δ but (δ − Rr) > δ) reduced by two corrective factors: the present value of the
opportunity costs of the stock externality,π∗
sRr/δ(δ−Rr), and the present value of the term
[2] that has already been described above. Finally, the price γ∗ of the habitat is simply the
present value of the ecosystem price for land.
Based on Proposition 6 (ii) we are able to calculate the value of the ecosystem in an






















































That value is composed of
• the species’ contribution to the aggregate marginal beneﬁts of public ecosystem services
[9] minus
• the total value (at the ecosystem price of land services) of the habitat [10] plus
• the aggregate value of all stock externalities in harvesting [11] plus
• the total value (at ecosystem prices) of all biomass harvested by humans [12].
From (29) - (31) it is straightforward to compute the total value of the ecosystem in an































































      
[14]

   

. (33)
28Our expression (32) provides a theoretical underpinning of Constanza et al. (1997)’s empirical valuation
of the world’s ecosystem services.
21It is interesting to observe that the value of habitat [10] cancels out when deriving the
value of the ecosystem (32). Suppressing stock externalities, formally Hni = Rr ≡ 0, the
formulas (32) and (33) have straightforward and appealing interpretations. The value of
the ecosystem then consists of the beneﬁts from ecosystem services [9] and from the value
of biomass harvested [12]. The value of the entire stock of land is then composed of the
value of economic land services [13] plus the value of habitat [10] minus the external cost
of economic land use [14].
6 Concluding remarks
The main purpose of the present paper is methodological and conceptual but it aims, at
the same time, to demonstrate that the application of a general-equilibrium competitive
allocation mechanism to a microfounded integrated ecological-economic system yields spe-
ciﬁc and new insight with regard to eﬃcient pricing of the ecosystem and its services. The
ecosystem and the economy are designed as interdependent submodels and the focus is on
intra-system interactions of individuals as well as on inter-system repercussions of these
interactions. Both submodels are characterized by resource scarcity and a decentralized
and uncoordinated mode of allocating resources. The competitive mechanism therefore ap-
pears to be an appropriate methodological device to ’coordinate’ the activities of optimizing
agents through prices. For economists, the ultimate way of assessing scarcity and value is
to put a price tag on the items under consideration. On the conceptual level we have shown
that our approach generates such prices in both submodels, and that it is able to determine
and compare the prices of goods, namely land services and biomass, that are traded in both
subsystems on competitive but disconnected markets.
As in other studies, in our analysis the source of ineﬃciencies remains, of course, the
"... interplay of properly deﬁned property rights, externalities and market failure" (Brown
2000, p. 875). The existence of exclusive property rights for the habitat or their absence
also plays a similar role in that context as in conventional studies. Yet our approach allows
a fresh diagnosis by linking ecosystem prices and economic prices as well as ecosystem prices
and the rates of corrective taxes. In the laissez-faire equilibrium of the IEES with open
access habitat economic agents disregard the ecosystem prices of land and biomass (as they
disregard other non-market spillovers) which calls for corrective regulation. We have shown
that there are taxes on economic land use and taxes on harvested biomass that are capable
to restore eﬃciency. Quantity (rather than price) regulation clearly is an alternative way
toward allocative eﬃciency being applied in practice in form of harvesting quotas, land use
restrictions, land zoning etc.
22Although the paper does not focus on applied techniques of valuating ecosystem com-
ponents, our approach has the potential to serve as a basis for a new kind of applied general
equilibrium analyses. By now, such analyses have become a standard tool for simulating
the incidence of economic policies with signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations in many economic markets.
With appropriate parametrizations and calibrations of both the economic and the ecosys-
tem submodel29 one would be able to run numerical simulations in a large-scale IEES to
gauge the quantitative impact on the whole system of alternative policies of biomass har-
vesting and economic land use. Such applications would generate numerical information on
ecosystem prices and values that would be an important input in designing eﬃcient natural
resource policies.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 follows from applying Theorem 11 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, chapter
6, p. 385). We refrain from tracing the requirements of that Theorem 11 in all detail.
However, the main substantive conditions are listed in Proposition 1. ￿
Derivation of rows 2, 3, 7, 8 and 10 in column 3 of Table 1:
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the harvesting ﬁrm’s problem (21”) are
L
h







hii = 0, (34a)
L
h












s = 0, (34b)
L
h
yig = −pyg + λhiH
i








































πs = 0, (34g)
˙ ψi = (δ − bi)ψi − λhiH
i




































































Taking into account that both at the social optimum and in the market we can choose
biomass of species 1 as numeraire (λzi1 = πz1 ≡ 1) establishes λzij = πzj and λsi = πs for all
i. Next, we use the species budget constraint πs(ωi − si) =
 
j πzjzij + πzihii, the demand
and supply functions Si (π,hii,ni,s), Zij (π,hii,ni,s) and the deﬁnition of the endowments
ωi :=
σis









ij (π,hii,ni,s) − πzihii = 0. (41)
Multiply equation (41) by ni and sum over i yields













πzihi = 0. (42)








































πzi − hi −
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ni = 0. (43e)
Finally, combining (34a) and (43a), (34b) and (43b), (34f) and (43c), (34g) and (43d), (34h)

























26Proof of Proposition 2:
Observe that the quasi-concavity of U and the concavity of the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi
(all i), Qk (all k), R ensures that the ﬁrst-order conditions listed in the colum 1 (2) of Table
1 are both necessary and suﬃcient for the eﬃcient (open acces IEES) allocation. To prove
Proposition 2 check that with the assignment of prices and taxes as listed in Proposition 2
there is an exact correspondence between the second column of Table 1 and the ﬁrst column
of Table 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
If for some predetermined time path of taxes, Θ, a general equilibrium of the IEES with
open access habitat exists, the associated equilibrium allocation entails speciﬁc values of
the externality-related variables H and R, say ¯ H and ¯ R. Rather than proving existence
for predetermined Θ we turn the problem on its head by showing that for predetermined
¯ H and ¯ R there exists some time path Θ for which a general equilibrium of the IEES
exists (and which then obviously exhibits H = ¯ H and R = ¯ R). To this end we maximize
the consumer’s present value utility subject to the constraints (1)-(14) and subject to the






α¯ hi(hi − ¯ hi) + α¯ r(r − ¯ r), (15’)
where LP is given by (15). The ﬁrst-order conditions are listed in column 1 of Table 1





+ αzi − α¯ hi (2’)
and





r + αs. (9a’)
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterize a Pareto eﬃcient allocation constrained by hi = ¯ hi
and r = ¯ r. The following lemma can be proven along the same lines as Proposition 1.
Lemma 1.
If the function U is quasi-concave and the functions Bi (all i), F, Hi (all i), Qk (all k), R
are concave, a solution (α,β,γ,ρ,A
m,A
y) to the Hamiltonian (15’) exists.
Next, setting phi = αvi (all i), pr = αr, pyg = αyg (all g), πzi = αzi > 0 (all i), πs = αs,





Uycg − α¯ r (any g), θhi = πzi − α¯ hi (all i) renders identical the equations
27in lines 1-11 of column 1 (where 2 and 9a are replaced by 2’ and 9a’) of Table 1 and the
equations in lines 1-11 of column 2 of Table 1. The matching of these columns together
with Lemma 1 proves that for predetermined
 ¯ H, ¯ R
 
there is a set of time paths of taxes,
say M
 ¯ H, ¯ R
 
, such that for any Θ ∈ M
 ¯ H, ¯ R
 
there exists a general equilibrium of the
IEES with open access habitat characterized by H = ¯ H and R = ¯ R.
Deﬁne Ω := {Θ
 
 Θ ∈ M
 ¯ H, ¯ R
 
for all ¯ H ≥ 0, ¯ R ≥ 0}. We clearly showed that Ω is non-
empty and that associated to every Θ ∈ Ω there is an equilibrium of the IEES. In fact,
there is no equilibrium of the IEES for predetermined Θ, if Θ / ∈ Ω. To validate that claim
suppose the contrary, i.e. suppose that there is some ˜ Θ / ∈ Ω supporting an equilibrium.
The associated equilibrium allocation then entails some speciﬁc time path of harvesting and
land conversion, say ˜ H and ˜ R. But we showed above that for
 
˜ H, ˜ R
 
there exists a set of
tax paths, M
 
˜ H, ˜ R
 
 = ∅ which necessarily contains ˜ Θ as an element. Hence ˜ Θ ∈ Ω. This
contradiction proves that there exists a general equilibrium for the IEES with open access
habitat for predetermined Θ, if and only if Θ ∈ Ω. ￿
The proof of Propositions 4 and 5, respectively, is analogous to the proof of Propositions 2
and 3, respectively, and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Equations (26), (27) and (29) follow from the equations in lines 2 and 9 (column general
equilibrium) of Table 1 taking into account θhi and θr from Proposition 2.














































































Equations (30) and (31) follow from the ﬁrst order conditions






˙ γ = γδ − αs
28of (15). Setting ˙ ρ = ˙ γ = 0 and using the information of Proposition 2 yields the desired
equations. ￿
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